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This thesis asks how international actors – in this case, the IMF and World Bank – 
advance their neoliberal projects. Specifically, it looks at the local context. How do economic 
reforms pass from IMF policy into national law? Who does the IMF cooperate with? What 
strategies are used, and what makes them effective for enacting and legitimizing policy? It 
starts by looking at the history of political mobilization in Turkey after WWII, when it took its 
first IMF loan. Turkish political parties have commonly sought electoral success through 
populist economic policies built on patron-client relationships. However, economic populism is 
a finite tool for the purposes of political mobilization. This is in part because Turkey’s particular 
political culture impedes the ability of political parties to organize within the population: a deep 
historical divide separates the central bureaucratic state from the still largely agrarian society. I 
will show how Turkey’s lack of a politically integrated civil society contributed to economic 
mismanagement, and also undermined any political will to engage in significant economic 






However, reforms progressed slowly and external debt mounted, culminating in a series of 
economic crises in the latter decades of the 20th century. 
The second half of the thesis focuses on the ascent of Turkey’s Islamist parties and the 
AKP. During the 80s and 90s Islamist parties built impressive civil society networks that were 
the envy of the other political parties. These networks gave Islamist political parties 
unprecedented capacity to reach out to and mobilize the population. The breadth of these civil 
society organizations contributed directly to the AKP’s consistent and resounding electoral 
success since 2002. In addition to solving Turkey’s chronic crisis of political hegemony, I argue 
that the AKP has successfully managed these organizations for the purpose of facilitating 
Turkey’s neoliberal reforms. I will look at the nature of these networks, how they operate, and 



























































THE SHAPE OF TURKEY’S POLITICAL AND CIVIL SOCIETY: CENTER VS PERIPHERY…..................…..4 
 
CRISIS AND RADICAL REFORM: TURKEY’S NEOLIBERAL PERIOD……………………...................………….7 
 
ISLAMIC POLITICAL AND CIVIL SOCIETY: EFFECTIVE MOBILIZATION………………...................……….17 
 

















MOBILIZING FOR CAPITALISM: 
HOW ISLAMIC CIVIL SOCIETY MAKES A MARKET ECONOMY POSSIBLE IN TURKEY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Military tanks rolled into the streets of Turkey’s major cities on September 12, 1980. 
Kenan Evran, one of several generals on the National Security Council, declared the coup d’état 
on the state television channel and extended martial law throughout the country. The military 
abolished Parliament, suspended the Constitution and banned all political parties and trade 
unions. Over the next three years the military government detained 650,000 people, put 
210,000 on trial, demanded the execution of 7,000, executed 517, and revoked the citizenship 
of 14,000.1 In addition, 171 people died of torture, 300 died while in jail due to “indeterminate” 
reasons, 23,677 organizations were closed down, 39 tons of printed news was burned, and 31 
journalists were jailed.2 Turkey’s military focused its violence on the Turkish left, worker’s 
unions, and socialist organizations, which had been exerting considerable power over Turkey’s 
economy and politics during the 1970’s. The coup decimated the Turkish left, and it still has not 
recovered.  
The political violence of the previous decade led the Washington Post to hail the “gentle 
coup” that would return normalcy to Turkey.3 With the assistance of the World Bank and IMF 
the military leaders appointed technocrats to implement “neoliberal” reforms that would shape 
Turkey’s economic transformation for the coming decades. The strong hand of the military 
                                                          
1 Akça, “Hegemonic Projects,” 16. 








junta4 – having removed the popularly-elected government – did what politicians could not: 
they oversaw the transition from a state-capitalist, protectionist economy based on import 
substitution to a market-oriented economy that liberalized trade and finance, privatized the 
state-owned enterprises, and ended organized labor.5  
Turkey’s neoliberalization followed a pattern comparable to other countries in the 
developing world. Unfortunately, the military coup – albeit an important moment – is not what 
makes this story unique, nor did it end the political and economic tumult. The IMF-directed 
neoliberal regime only exacerbated Turkey’s crisis of political hegemony, which continued for 
the next two decades. The 90s in particular were marked by weak coalition governments and 
elections where no party was able to win more than 27 percent of the vote. The mobilization of 
civil society was central to ending this crisis. Civil society organized voters, integrated them with 
political society, and acted as a medium for adjusting citizens to the new market economy.  
I believe Turkey’s example accords with Foucault’s description of civil society as a 
“governmental technology”: a tool of “omnipresent government, a government which nothing 
escapes” because it “manages civil society, the nation, society, the social” but yet does not 
infringe on economic laws and “respects the specificity of the economy.”6 For him “civil society 
is the concrete ensemble within which these ideal points, economic men, must be placed so 
                                                          
4 Akça, “Hegemonic Projects,” 16. Points out the strikingly similarity between other neoconservative projects in the 
cooperation between authoritarianism and market restructuring.  
 
David Harvey. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. 79-82. David Harvey also notes that authoritarianism is a commonly 
favored method for enforcing a market-oriented economy, and that this tendency in neoliberalism sits at odds 
with individual freedoms. “neoconservatives therefore emphasize militarization as an antidote to the chaos of 
individual interests.” 
5 All these changes in the organization of the economy are framed as encouraging competition. 






that they can be appropriately managed.”7 In short, civil society is an extension of the state and 
exists for the purpose of inconspicuous economic management.  
This thesis asks how international actors – in this case, the IMF and World Bank – 
advance their neoliberal projects. Specifically, it looks at the local context. How do economic 
reforms pass from IMF policy into national law? Who does the IMF cooperate with? What 
strategies are used, and what makes them effective for enacting and legitimizing policy? I start 
by looking at the history of political mobilization in Turkey after WWII, when it took its first IMF 
loan. Similar to Philip Oxhorn’s description of Latin America, Turkish political parties have 
commonly sought electoral success through populist economic policies built on patron-client 
relationships.8 However, economic populism is a finite tool for the purposes of political 
mobilization. This is in part because Turkey’s particular political culture impedes the ability of 
political parties to organize within the population: a deep historical divide separates the central 
bureaucratic state from the still largely agrarian society.9 I will show how Turkey’s lack of a 
politically integrated civil society contributed to economic mismanagement, and also 
undermined any political will to engage in significant economic reform. The IMF continued to 
loan Turkey money, and pushed its desired economic policy. However, reforms progressed 
slowly and external debt mounted, culminating in a series of economic crises in the latter 
decades of the 20th century. 
                                                          
7 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 297. 
8 Philip Oxhorn, “Controlled Inclusion,” 250. 






The second half of the paper focuses on the ascent of Turkey’s Islamist parties and the 
AKP. During the 80s and 90s Islamist parties built impressive civil society networks that were 
the envy of the other political parties. These networks gave Islamist political parties 
unprecedented capacity to reach out to and mobilize the population. The breadth of these civil 
society organizations contributed directly to the AKP’s consistent and resounding electoral 
success since 2002. In addition to solving Turkey’s chronic crisis of political hegemony, I argue 
that the AKP has successfully managed these organizations for the purpose of facilitating 
Turkey’s neoliberal reforms. I will look at the nature of these networks, how they operate, and 
how they are integral to naturalizing market logic among a large section of Turkey’s population. 
 
THE SHAPE OF TURKEY’S POLITICAL AND CIVIL SOCIETY: CENTER VS PERIPHERY 
Turkish sociologist Şerif Mardin argues that an urban, centralized bureaucracy defined 
the governmental structure of the Ottoman Empire, and that the Turkish Republic inherited this 
model.10 The politics of “center-periphery” relations is especially evident during the first three 
decades of the Republic when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi or the CHP) dominated as the sole party. The “center” – the military, judiciary, and 
the CHP – acted as the bulwark of Atatürk’s legacy of secular modernization and they ruled the 
nationalization projects of the profoundly heterodox young nation-state. However, the CHP was 
reluctant to engage with and mobilize the rural population.11 The Republicans saw in the 
                                                          
10 Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations.”  
11 This can be explained by the CHP’s fear that engagement with the countryside risked harming the integrity of the 
nation, as the rural population would first be loyal to their local identity. In this sense Turkey was in a similar 






countryside the centrifugal forces that threatened their new nation: “Do not go into the 
provincial towns or villages to gather support: our national unity will be undermined.”12 In 
other words, they suspected that “provincial primordial groups will be resurrected as political 
parties.”13 The CHP’s detachment, and so failure to form organizational links with much of 
society explains its marginalization as Turkey’s population grew and became increasingly 
complex. From the perspective of Samuel Huntington they had failed to dominate the raw 
social forces which need to be tempered and moderated by political institutions: “a 
government with a low level of institutionalization is not just a weak government; it is also a 
bad government.”14         
Kemalist ideology was not able to overcome the distance between political society and 
the rural population, which became apparent in 1950 when Turkey moved towards a multi-
party system.15 “Periphery” parties which positioned themselves against the central 
bureaucracy regularly won large majorities in elections. The success of the first significant 
opposition party – The Democrat Party (DP) – was coordinated by party elites from the CHP 
who did not vary radically in their political beliefs, but who saw the potential of a political 
ideology that would appeal to the rural population.16 The DP made gestures to Islam – the 
conspicuous patronizing of mosques and some religious rituals – and also promised to loosen 
                                                          
Empire. In both Eastern Europe and in Anatolia ethnic cleansing, forced assimilation were endemic to their 
nationalization projects. 
12 F. Köprülü, “Partiler ve Milli Birlik” Demokrasi Yolunda. (The Hague: 1964). 304. 
13 Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations” 182. 
14 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 28. 
15 Though decades of indoctrination through the education system would have its effect, producing citizens who to 
varying degrees are loyal to Turkish nationalism and the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Hybrid versions can also 
be seen in Islamic Nationalists and Kemalist Marxists. 






bureaucratic controls over the economy. The agricultural population, which had been largely 
ignored by the economic planning of the previous decades, saw a flurry of public investment.17 
Members of the Democrat Party formed new relationships with the villages and local elite; 
“deals, trade-offs, and bargains became much more pervasive… client politics flourished on a 
new level.”18  
However, the representatives of laicism in Turkey – the judiciary, the military and the 
CHP – defended their power and fought vehemently against any signs of “Islamification.”19 In 
1960 the military removed the Democrat Party from government, ostensibly for crimes against 
the secular ideology of Kemalism. This was the first intervention of many. There would be two 
more military coups, several near coups, and the Constitutional Court would shut down twenty-
four political parties, many of which were Islamist, after having won in popular elections.20 The 
struggle between the central Kemalist state and popular parties defined the pattern of Turkish 
politics for the following decades. Opposition parties continued to mobilize their constituencies 
through clientelistic relations, populist economic redistribution and, often, careful appeals to 
                                                          
17 The DP greatly expanded the highway system, but agricultural equipment (through the Marshall Plan) and built 
dams for irrigation. 
18 Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations” 185. 
19 So much so that “Secularism versus Islam” continues to frame much of the political discourse in Turkey. The 
limited binary of this discourse often works to the disadvantage of the CHP because it handicaps how they frame 
their opposition to popular Islam-leaning parties, and because the CHP’s opposition confirms the Islamic legitimacy 
of their target. 
20 In 1960 the military removed the center-right Democratic Party and executed its leader, Adnan Menderes; in 
1971 the military removed Suleyman Demirel’s center-right Justice Party; in 1980 military removed the coalition 
government which included the Islamist National Salvation party. There were several iterations of Islamist parties – 
largely with the same cadre and leadership – that were sequentially shut down by the military and judiciary: the 
Milli Order Party in 1971; the Milli Salvation Party in 1980; The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in 1998. In 2001 the 
Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) was judged unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court and banned. In 2008 the 
Constitutional Court nearly banned the current “conservative democrat” Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve 






Islam.21 Economic favors formed the backbone of a weak incorporation of the “periphery” into 
Turkey’s political space. As a result, the political parties were beholden to the economic 
demands of their constituency.   
In the next decades Turkey’s leaders continued to borrow heavily from the IMF. Debt 
fueled GDP growth through the mid-70s despite the 1973’s sharp rise in oil prices and the 
lowest export/import ratio in the Republic’s history.22 Political and economic instability 
increased in tandem during the late 70s, and foreign lenders cut off credit to Turkey after 
1977.23 An IMF program was agreed on in 1978, but quickly canceled because significant 
economic reforms had not been made. In 1979 social democrat Bulent Ecevit, then leader of 
the CHP, negotiated a new IMF program. However this agreement also looked doomed to fail. 
At the beginning of 1980 the government was unable to important essentials – oil, coal, and 
coffee – because of a shortage of foreign exchange. 
 
CRISIS AND RADICAL REFORM: TURKEY’S NEOLIBERAL PERIOD 
Turkey’s economic transformation of the 1980s and 1990s follows a pattern 
recognizable in the rest of the developing world. The IMF attached policy requirements of 
financial liberalization and privatization to its monetary assistance, much as it did in post-Soviet 
                                                          
21 Of course, this is only a broad picture. Turkish politics are remarkably pluralistic. There have been parties that 
rallied to Marxism, Maoism, Shi’ism, Kurdish Nationalism, Shamanistic Ultra-Nationalism, etc., but the political 
strategy of the larger and more successful parties that were not immediately shut down are what I am attempting 
to outline. 
22 Hisamoğlu, Turkish Economic Development, 124. 






Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, and South America. This section looks at the period after the 
1980 military coup: its political context and neoliberal economic reforms. The Turkish 
government – composed mostly of center-right parties like those described above – passed 
many radical economic reforms into law, but lacked the mechanisms to properly manage a 
market economy.  
In addition to neoliberal reforms the military also oversaw the drafting of a new 
constitution. The constitution included references to Islam for the first time in its definition of 
Turkishness.24 The generals’ state sanctioned Turkish-Islam synthesis was intended to solve the 
country’s crisis of political hegemony, bridge the gap between the state and the “periphery”, 
and coopt the success of the Islamist and center-right parties.25 I will wait to discuss the effects 
of the military’s controlled opening to religion in a later section on Islamic civil society.26 
However, it is important to note that TÜSİAD (the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessman’s 
Association, or Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği) – the organization that represents the 
interests of the Turkey’s largest conglomerates and holding companies – was one of the only 
societal organizations exempted from the repression of the 1980 coup. 
A key figure in the post-coup period is Turgut Özal, an engineering student from the 
Eastern Anatolian city of Malatya. His experience at the World Bank and at high level positions 
                                                          
24 Özbudun “Turkey’s Search for a New Constitution.”; Cihan Tuğal, The Fall of the Turkish Model, 69. 
25 Özbudun “The Turkish Constitutional Court,” 152. 
26 They permitted an increased number of Imam Hatip Schools (religious training schools) and required religious 
classes be included in the state curriculum. The military violently repressed the Turkish left, but was permissive of 
religious civil society organizations so long as they didn’t get involved in politics. The shift of the Turkish state 
towards an alliance with the religious right should also be understood in the context of the Cold War and the 
struggle against Communism. American allies often sided with religious groups in their struggle against the left. In 
the next two decades the military/state also enlisted the help of militant religious groups in the irregular/guerilla 






in the private sector led Suleyman Demirel – Turkey’s Prime Minister in 1980 – to make him the 
head of the economic team in charge of implementing the reforms required by the previous 
year’s IMF stabilization program.27 Özal was one of the few officials to remain in government 
after the military coup came a few months later. The generals appointed him as Deputy Prime 
Minister in charge of Economic Affairs, following the advice of the IMF. Under military tutelage 
Turkey was able to go forward with the economic reforms that the political leaders of the past 
few years had been loath to enact due to their populist obligations.  
Özal represents a new kind of politician in Turkey, and comes out of an emerging class 
that is educated, but pious.28 For the elections of 1983 the military had banned all previous 
politicians and their parties, allowed only three new parties to run, and so had effectively 
flattened the political playing field. In this environment, Özal, at the head of his newly 
organized center-right Anavatan Partisi (The Motherland Party, ANAP), was able to handily 
defeat the party preferred by the military elite and take a majority of the seats in parliament. 
His economic experience appealed to domestic and international business elites, while his 
Anatolian background, conservatism, and religious leanings – he once unsuccessfully ran for 
parliament under the umbrella of the Islamist Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, 
MSP) – gave him popular appeal. In his new position as Prime Minister, He was able to 
aggressively continue with economic and financial deregulation.  
Developing countries across the world were shifting from an import-substitution 
economic model to one that was export-driven. In this direction, Özal abolished price controls, 
                                                          
27 Öniş, “Turgut Özal,” 115;  






reduced economic barriers, and provided subsidies to encourage exports. His reforms resulted 
in early success, in large part because he was able to attract investment from the international 
financial community. His marketization of Turkey’s economy has been likened to Margaret 
Thatcher’s policies in the UK, as he privatized state industries and incentivized Turkey’s middle 
class to become stake-holders through the sale of revenue sharing certificates and high interest 
rates on small investments.29 Özal’s policy reforms show a deep belief in market logic. 
In summary, Özal cooperated with the IMF to liberalize Turkey’s economy and financial 
accounts with the intention of integrating Turkey into the global economy. However, he 
neglected to reform the culture of informal relations and system of patronage that existed 
between politics and business, and himself showed a disregard for the rule of law.30 Though he 
recruited young and well educated technocrats to manage newly created economic regulatory 
bodies, these new institutions were not yet empowered to carry out their functions when Özal 
fully liberalized the capital account in 1989 and allowed the full convertibility of the Turkish 
                                                          
29 Öniş, “Turgut Özal,” 118-9. 
30 Hisamoğlu, Turkish Economic Development, 133-5. For example: Exporters took advantage of subsidies by 
falsifying documents, leading to huge irregularities in export estimates. Laws were passed in the morning reducing 
custom duties that were then reversed in the afternoon once the goods had cleared. Such infractions were often 
left unpunished.  
 
Karadağ, “Neoliberal Restructuring,” 20. In 1989 his son Ahmet Özal and Cem Uzan started Turkey’s first private TV 
station, Star TV. They quickly moved into construction, energy, finance (Imar Bank), and communications (Telsim). 
 
Karadağ, “Neoliberal Restructuring,” 17. “The decade has witnessed an intensification of particularistic relations 
between the state and private sector actors with claims on public resources. Exporters who were supported by tax 
rebates, investors in tourism and real estate benefitting from preferential credits, and the bidders for public sector 
enterprises in privatization deals have all appeared as important actors in newly emerging networks among public 
authorities and private businessmen. Liberalization and deregulation have provided ample opportunities for the 







Lira.31 In this environment Turkey’ financial institutions were unable to control the economic 
chaos and corruption that followed in the 90s.32 
 
THE 90s AND IMMATURE GLOBALIZATON 
 In the period immediately following the liberalization of the capital account, high 
interest rates attracted international capital in the form of short-term capital flows, allowing 
dangerous amounts of domestic and public borrowing.33 The GNP in 1990 grew by 9.4%, but at 
the same time the domestic debt and budget deficit were also increasing.34 As deficits 
increased, interest rates rose, as well as inflation. In 1994 Turkey’s credit rating was reduced, 
and short-term capital fled the country. Overnight interbank rates soared to 500%, inflation 
reached 100%, the Turkish lira devalued against the dollar by 165% and real growth declined by 
6.1%. Turkey’s premature liberalizing, without the proper regulatory bodies in place, proved to 
be costly. IMF-directed financial liberalization had allowed speculative international finance to 
gamble on Turkey’s economy: international creditors profited at the expense of Turkey’s 
economic stability. This crisis was the first of a series of crises that would lead up to 2001.  
Regulation was not the sole issue, however, the 90s continued to be defined by the 
relationship between politicians and their supporters as patrons to clients. The system of 
political patronage continued via the public banks as the principle avenue for distribution: 
                                                          
31 Öniş and Aysan, “Neoliberal Globalization,” 129; Öniş, “Turgut Özal,” 123. 
32 Öniş, “Turgut Özal,” 121. 
33 Öniş and Aysan, “Neoliberal Globalization,” 129-130. “It became possible to realize annual returns as high as 47% 
on the dollar in 1989, 25% in 1990, 18% in 1992, and 18% in 1993.” 






Ziraat Bank helped channel funds to agricultural producers and Halk Bank heavily subsidized 
small and medium sized business.35 One shocking example is the story of Cavit Çağlar. He was a 
friend of Suleyman Demirel (the Prime Minister at the time), and the Minister in charge of state 
banks from 1995 to 1996. Using his connections he first set up a textile company, then quickly 
started diversifying into finance and media, and used strategic bankruptcies, with his bank, 
Interbank, to funnel money out of his holding companies. He also aided in similar practices on 
behalf of the banks of friends within Demirel’s circle.36 Political Economist Ziya Öniş summarizes 
this decade when he states: 
“It was also clear from the experience of the post-1999 era that the basic orientation of 
political parties in Turkey had not fundamentally changed over time. The parties continued to 
act as patronage networks serving narrowly based sectional interests as opposed to serving 
the interests of broad segments of the society as a whole.”37 
In summary, because political parties operated through narrow patron-client relationships they 
did not command the means necessary to manage globally integrated economy. They were 
powerless to implement broader economic reforms. Instead they stuck awkwardly between a 
state-capitalism and market-based economy with an under regulated financial sector that left 
the country vulnerable to international and domestic predation. Nor were political leaders able 
to control the broader discourse surrounding the economy, resulting in popular anger and 
protests when their constituencies fell victim to the inevitable hazards of a neoliberal economy. 
                                                          
35 Alper and Öniş, “Financial Globalization,” 10; Öniş, “Domestic Politics versus Global Dynamics,” 14. 
36 Karadağ, “Neoliberal Restructuring,” 20. 






Domestic panic multiplied with the flightiness of international capital to produce Turkey’s 2001 
financial meltdown.     
 
THE CRISIS OF 2000 and 2001 
“You never want a serious crisis to go to waste” (Rahm Emmanuel) 
Turkey’s debt funded growth and spending reached its limit by the end of 1999. 
Domestic debt had reached such an extent that paying the interest proved a significant burden 
for the state.38 In December of 1999, a tacit agreement was made with the IMF. Its main target 
was inflation: bring consumer inflation down to 25% by the end of 2000, 12% by the end of 
2001, and 7% by the end of 2002.39 A new coalition government formed in April of 1999 – the 
left nationalist Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party, DSP), the ultra-nationalist Milliyetçi 
Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party, MHP), and the center-right ANAP – despite their 
considerable ideological differences, seemed committed to countering inflation and carrying 
through with the IMF reforms. However during the early months of 2000 the cohesion of the 
coalition began to falter as they hesitated to enact reforms that would negatively impact their 
low-income constituency (especially the DSP and MHP). With intense external pressure from 
the international finance community and the EU, the coalition government continued with its 
IMF program, but it was not enough to hold investor confidence. In November 2000 there was a 
                                                          
38 Öniş, “Domestic Politics versus Global Dynamics,” 10. 






mass exodus of short-term capital. As a result, Demirbank, the bank most troubled by the crisis, 
effectively lost all of its capital in two days.40  
A cold winter, coal shortages, and a liquidity crisis failed to thaw Turkey’s parliamentary 
impasse. Inflation continued to spike, and its current account deficit steadily expanded. On 
February 19th, 2001, in the middle of a heated and highly publicized argument the Turkish 
President threw a copy of the constitution at the Prime Minister and sent the markets crashing 
into the worst economic crisis in Turkish history. On that day panic caused a rush on the dollar 
as banks sold off their lira, which caused the overnight lending rate to skyrocket to 4500%.41  
The next day followed with a cascade of payment defaults by most banks, and on February 22nd 
the Turkish Lira lost 40% of its value against the dollar.42 Many banks, especially state banks, 
were left unable to honor deposits. The GNP in real terms declined by 9.4% over the course of 
the year. Per capita income dropped dramatically from $2,986 to $2,110, and unemployment 
increased by one million people.43 In reaction, large sections of the population took to the 
streets in the most violent protests since the 1980s. Composed mostly of tradesmen, artisans 
and the urban poor – groups close to the center-right, Islamist and nationalist parties – the 
protestors shouted slogans of “Damn the IMF!” and demanded the resignation of the current 
government.44 They clearly made the connection between international finance and their 
current economic predicament.  
                                                          
40 Öniş, “Domestic Politics versus Global Dynamics,” 13 
41 Rijckeghem and Üçer, Chronicle of the Turkish Financial Cries of 2000-1, 79. 
42 Rijckeghem and Üçer, Chronicle of the Turkish Financial Cries of 2000-1, 81-86. 
43 Öniş, “Domestic Politics versus Global Dynamics,” 15. 






The crisis prompted Prime Minister Ecevit to ask Kemal Derviş, who had been working 
for the World Bank, to come help coordinate the recovery plan. Humbled by the events of the 
previous year, the same coalition government listened to Derviş’s recommendations and 
passed a record amount of laws in the next 18 months.45 The laws brought significant structural 
changes to the economy and were intended to rein in inflation and bring the economic back to 
fully functioning order within the next three years. The current parties seemed to have 
accepted the end of business as usual. The consecutive crises of November and February, on 
top of the preceding decade, demonstrated the total bankruptcy of “a model of development 
based on clientelistic ties and patronage networks.”46  
The crises also highlights the role of the IMF in pushing the shift to market 
fundamentalism in Turkey. Financial liberalization facilitated Turkey’s integration with 
international capital, ostensibly producing economic growth. On a closer look, however, while 
GDP and wealth have increased, the volatility of Turkey’s financial liberalization has negatively 
affected wealth equality, income distribution, unemployment, and personal savings.47 The IMF 
was negligent of the risks that under-regulated capital flows presented to the developing 
world.48 Speculative short term capital flows followed rent-seeking logic in the hunt for high 
interest rates and quick returns, and the sudden flight of international capital was responsible 
                                                          
45 Derviş, “Returning from the Brink,” 67. A total of 19 important structural laws and reforms in less than a year, 
including full independence of the Central Bank. 
46 Öniş, “Domestic Politics versus Global Dynamics,” 15. 
47 Fikret Senses, “Turkey’s Experience,” 19. 
48 Öniş, “Domestic Politics versus Global Dynamics,” 14. It also didn’t consider Turkey’s political culture. 
International credit enabled the accumulation of massive debt by state and private entities, perpetuating rent-
seeking behavior. “Politicians and policymakers who conceived of private banks as a major means of government 







for comparable economic crises in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Argentina, Japan, et al. during 
the 80s and 90s.49 David Harvey identifies speculative investment and the sudden flight of 
poorly regulated global finance as a significant source of wealth for creditors and creditor 
nations:50 “It was this flow of tribute from the rest of the world that founded much of the 
affluence achieved in the US in the 1990s.”51 [Emphasis mine] 
Ever since the end of WWII Turkey has regularly borrowed from the IMF. In exchange for 
badly needed credit, its politicians were at the mercy of IMF policy demands. By 2002 Turkey 
had the undesirable distinction of the all-time greatest recipient of IMF loans, with $31 billion 
borrowed and $131.6 in overall external debt.52 Similar to 1980, the country faced a serious 
crisis of capital. Turkey’s political parties lacked the will to carry out the required reforms, nor 
were they able to generate the consensus needed to legitimize them. In 1980 the iron fist of 
the military was able to overcome this crisis. Since then the state apparatus (in particular the 
military) had cautiously accepted Islamic identity. The development of Islamic political and civil 
society provided a more subtle and lasting solution to the crisis of political hegemony and 
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economic management in 2002. In the next section I will show how Islam and Islamic civil 
society made possible the project of market fundamentalism. 
 
ISLAMIC POLITICAL AND CIVIL SOCIETY: EFFECTIVE MOBILIZATION 
Concerning the expression “Islamic government,” why immediately cast suspicion on the 
adjective “Islamic”? The word “government” suffices, in itself, to awaken vigilance.53  
This section looks at Islamist parties, the AKP, and their rise to political hegemony. Islamic 
political parties, more successfully than any previous party, did the work of building civil society 
networks: a crucial technology of governance that had been missing in the previous decades. 
However, the Islamist parties were originally not willing to cooperate with the IMF, and 
generally spoke against the West and capitalism. Gradually the pressures of international 
finance and the Turkish state forced them to conform to IMF policy. Neoliberalism, Turkish 
political leadership, and public opinion finally aligned during the reign of the AKP. I will show 
that the AKP, with the help of an integrated civil society, was able to shape the economic 




                                                          








ISLAMISTS & THE REFAH PARTY: ORGANIZATION, INTEGRATION AND ASSIMILATION 
The political origins of Turkey’s Islamist movement lie in the Milli Görüş, or National 
Vision, a party platform written by Necmettin Erbakan in 1975.54 The ideology of Erbakan’s 
party – Milli Nazim Partisi (National Order Party, MNP) – hedged between Islam and 
nationalism, exemplified in the word milli: an Arabic word that has Islamic connotations, but 
which has been coopted in Turkish to refer to the concept of “nation”. Economically the party’s 
“Just Order” opposed inequality and economic exploitation, a policy which appealed to the 
poor and working class population that formed its base: small businessmen, tradesmen, 
peasants and artisans. I will fast forward to Erbakan’s Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP), – 
founded in 1983 – both because it was the first to see broad electoral success, but also because 
of its organizational structure.  
The Islamist parties, were, and are, intimately involved in civil society outreach and 
organization to a far greater degree than any of the other political parties in Turkey. The Refah 
Party’s youth foundations recruited actively in schools. The Milli Gençlik Vakfı (National Youth 
Foundation, MGV) had approximately thirty-five thousand student members between 1991 and 
1996.55 It had representatives in almost every hallway in every school, who were responsible 
for bringing one person to the foundation every semester. The foundation provided lunch, 
school supplies, health services, lodging, physical training, English and math lessons, and 
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organized religious conferences and pilgrimages. Most MGV members went on to become 
active in the Refah Party. 
The women’s commissions were important for organizing in the neighborhoods and 
working with families. Because the social mores in many pious neighborhoods inhibits gender 
interaction, women have more freedom to enter the homes of strangers. Therefore, it was 
usually women organizers who determined which families were in need of help, apportioned 
municipal funds, and distributed goods.56 They also organized trips and mobilized for 
elections.57  
The personnel and resources of Islamic charity foundations often overlapped with the 
municipal governments managed by the RP.58 In addition to the services described above, 
foundations also provided marriage counseling, employment assistance, and healthcare 
support. It often coordinated these services with the municipality (though only informally), but 
relied primarily on private donations for financial support.59 Foundations also coordinate large 
networks of schools, such as that of Sufi cleric Fethullah Gülen, which started schools across 
Turkey and the world, and were integral to training a generation of technically skilled 
bureaucrats.60 
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However, in Turkey the organizational activities of religious groups operated under the 
gaze of a hawkish secular state. The state closely policed and limited any overtly political 
activity by Islamist groups, especially after the 1997 military intervention.61 Repression had its 
effects. Each time the military or judiciary closed down an Islamist party it regrouped with a 
readjusted strategy and ideology. The umbrella Islamist parties began to self-police: although 
the Refah Party attracted members of the smaller radical Islamist parties after its modest 
political success in the 1991 elections, it also moderated them, marginalized the activists, and 
sometimes even expelled unrepentant radicals from its ranks.62 
 
POLITICAL SUCCESS AND THE STATE’S REACTION 
The Islamist parties saw particular success at the municipal level, where the state had 
less reach. The state neglected the peripheral squatter towns, allowing the Islamist parties to 
fill that space, provide services, and construct alternative authority structures.63 The Refah 
Party – motivated by Islamic charity and non-Marxist socialism – was able to curtail municipal 
corruption, and efficiently provide more social services to the urban poor in Turkey’s rapidly 
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growing cities.64 The RP saw considerable success in the 1994 local elections, winning several of 
Turkey’s largest cities, including Istanbul and Ankara.65 Next to the corruption of the other 
political parties the RP was seen as having moral integrity, thereby increasing its popularity 
among the voting population. So much so that in the 1995 elections it became the largest party, 
with two-fifths of its votes coming from people who identified as “secular”.66 But the Refah 
Party’s success proved fatal. Its increased power enabled some parliamentarians to work for 
their own benefit. Corruption increased within the party, irreparably damaging its reputation.67 
Progress on furthering the neoliberal reforms begun in the 80s had also stalled out, and the 
business community became concerned about the party’s anti-capitalist stance and poorly 
articulated economic plan.68 In 1997, the military intervened and forced the Refah Party 
government to resign on the grounds of anti-secular activities. Corruption had caused intra-
party conflicts and the RP was unable to put up an organized resistance to state pressure. 
TÜSİAD – the Turkish Industry and Business Association, which represented Turkey’s largest and 
oldest conglomerates – vehemently supported the military actions.69 The US and EU both failed 
to condemn the coup.70        
In 1998 the party reformed as The Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) and removed the anti-
capitalist rhetoric from its program, though it maintained much of its leadership, civil society 
                                                          
64 Tuğal, Passive Revolution, 50.  
65 Tuğal, The Fall of the Turkish Model, 71. In 1994 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the mayor of Istanbul. 
66 Jenny White. Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks. p.41. 
67 Tuğal, Passive Revolution, 80. Corruption and pursuit of material gain had the effect of weakening the ideological 
convictions of the party members. Activists within the party became marginalized. 
68 Tuğal, Passive Revolution, 50-51. 
69 Akça “Hegemonic Projects,” 27. 






networks and support base.71 Members within the party also promoted a pro-Western position, 
and reframed religious issues – such as the headscarf – in the language of human rights.72 
However, in defense of secularism, the Constitutional Court again closed down the Virtue Party 
in 2001. At this point the party split, with its younger members, under the charismatic 
leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, forming the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (The Justice and 
Development Party, AKP). 
 
THE AKP: THE ARTICULATION OF NEOLIBERALISM WITH ISLAMIC CIVIL SOCIETY 
“The poor here have the dynamism and enthusiasm necessary for upward mobility.”73  
(Alaaddin Ersoy, AKP mayor of Sultanbeyli) 
The most recent manifestation of the Islamist movement – though we should question 
whether the adjective “Islamist” can be attached to the AKP – has been careful to avoid 
explicitly Islamic language, and has insisted on referring to itself as “conservative democrat”.74 
However its founding members come from the previous Islamist party and clearly display 
Islamic identities.75 The Islamic cause had become about lifestyle, rather than changing the 
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system or state.76 The AKP won a large majority in parliament in the 2002 elections, and it 
relied on the networks formed by previous Islamist parties in the ‘80s and ‘90s to solidify its 
political hegemony.77  
I now turn to the ostensible “success” of neoliberalism during the AKP era by looking at 
several key developments. One, the negotiations with the IMF following the 2001 crisis and 
AKP’s electoral victory. Pinned awkwardly between the military, the Constitutional Court, the 
CHP, and the business community, the AKP was obliged to comply with the terms of Turkey’s 
2001 IMF bailout package. Two, its ideological position meant that it was able to reduce the 
resistance to economic reforms which have had only mixed economic reward for its voting 
constituency.78 In fact, the naturalization of market logic has proven to be one of the most 
successful public opinion campaigns of its tenure in government. Three, privatization, 
previously the least successful component of the IMF reforms, proceeds at a rapid pace 
alongside the commodification of urban space. Four, the burden of social welfare provision has 
shifted to municipal governments, which rely on civil society networks for financial support, 
organization and distribution.79 A deeper examination of Turkey’s economic success since 2002 
begs the question: success according to whom?    
The IMF immediately began putting pressure on the new AKP government to stick to the 
agreed economic reforms by withholding a $1.6 billion loan disbursement. At the same time 
investors and international credit rating agencies reminded the new government of Argentina’s 
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2001 debt default, which came after the IMF punitively stopped disbursement of a pending 
tranche because of unsatisfactory compliance with IMF targets.80 As a result, the AKP was 
forced to amend its campaign promises of economic justice. One example was its plan to 
increase payments for the pensions and salaries of civil servants. In negotiations with the IMF, 
the AKP was compelled to fund these pay increases by raising taxes on alcoholic beverages, 
cigarettes, white, brown, and luxury goods, as well as putting a consumption tax on car fuel: 
effectively undermining the benefits of its promised pay raises.81  Similarly, the AKP had to back 
off of designs for infrastructure spending, cut agricultural subsidies and compromise on tax 
reconciliation. The IMF’s constant threats to withhold loans coupled with Turkey’s massive 
indebtedness forced the AKP to give priority to macro-economic indicators and to paying down 
its debt to the IMF: “the IMF’s priorities became those of the AKP.”82 While the AKP has 
satisfied the IMF, the same can’t be said for economic justice. Wealth inequality and 
unemployment have both increased considerable. In 2000 the richest 1 percent controlled 38.1 
percent of the wealth. In 2014 their share was 54.3 percent.83 During the same period 
unemployment went from 8.4 to 11.9 percent.84 In 2014 the government calculated that 36 
percent of the youth population was neither working nor going to school.85 In addition, quality 
of life indicators, as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI), have remained 
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mediocre.86 The AKP has effectively deflected criticism of its acquiescence to IMF demands by 
publicly emphasizing the negotiated nature of the economic reforms, insisting “The patient 
belongs to us, not to the IMF.”87 It has also skillfully shaped the economic discourse. 
The massively popular former Prime Minister and current President Tayyip Erdogan – 
perhaps more than any other figure – is responsible for shaping the discourse surrounding the 
market.  He popularized the phrase “money has no religion and no belief” which has now 
become a staple of the party.88 Coming from a rough, lower-class neighborhood, Erdoğan, a 
practicing Muslim with a hyper-masculine style, commands the respect of the working poor, 
who say he “looks like us.”89 He speaks frequently about his vision of a reformed national 
economy, and makes skillful use of neoliberal rhetoric, positioning himself and the AKP in 
opposition to an oppressive state:  
Do you know what the real problem in Turkey is? Bureaucratic oligarchy. We, as the executive, 
want to do something. Do you think that we have the easiness that the private sector enjoys? 
Believe me, we do not have this easiness. We said we would govern according to the merchant 
mentality. We still think the same.90 
He mixes the remembered struggle of the Islamist parties together with neoliberalism’s 
economic agenda. In his discourse the market becomes associated with victory over the 
authoritarian state, thereby generating consent for the AKP’s neoliberal agreements.  
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Part of the adjustment to a competitive economy means giving priority to work ethic 
and productivity. In this direction, Islamic charity foundations preferred assisting poor families 
by finding a job for the male of household, rather than through direct financial assistance, 
because as one director states “if a family is poor because the father isn’t working and we find 
out that the father isn’t working because he sits in the coffeehouse all day, then if we help that 
family, we are just supporting his bad behavior.”91 Religious figures played a similar role in 
instilling work ethic. These are the words of a prayer leader at a central mosque on Friday:  
You should be thankful to God for being able to pray in this warm mosque. But you should ask 
yourself: What can I do with this gift from God? First, God hates laziness. Does God like 
laziness? [Many people murmur: he does not.] You should work very hard. You should not 
forget that this is a part of your religion. You should wake up very early in the morning, 
perform your payer, then start to work. Second, you should not forget that you are all one 
under God. You may be Kurdish, Circassian, Turkish, but before God you’re all the same. You 
should not be divided. Look what happens when you are divided.92  
He exhorts the importance of work ethic, a new phenomenon in Friday sermons.93 He also 
argues for mild nationalism. The last sentence “look what happens when you are divided” is a 
reference to the sectarian conflict of the Iraqi civil war. He points to very real ethnic differences 
in Turkey, but emphasizes that good Muslim ethics encourage passiveness, gratefulness, and 
hard work.  
 Individuals began to see the market as being part of the divine order, another 
phenomenon of the past five years. Yaman, a former radical Islamist, teacher, and now shop 
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owner describes his perspective on the Islamist movements and vagaries of the market: “We 
[the Islamists] used to say that even standing in the shade of a bank is a sin… Now Islamists get 
in line to put money in the bank. They are after the money they have not earned all their lives 
[because of Islamist activities and beliefs]… We fought all our lives for an Islamic order. We 
could not achieve it. This is not a light load to carry… The situation of the Islamists is like this: if 
we [as the family members who run this clothing store] have a loss at the end of the month, I 
gather my children and say, ‘What can we do? This is our nasip [that which is allotted by God].’ 
If I don’t approach the situation like this, I will lose my head. Just like this, I see the present 
condition of the Islamists as our nasip.”94 Yaman acknowledges that Islamists have accepted the 
financial system which they once rejected, saying it was their fate (or nasip). He illustrates this 
acceptance through a metaphor of the business cycle, which is also determined by fate. Yaman 
uses religious language to explain his and other Islamists’ assimilation into the market, as well 
as to explain the fluctuations of the market itself, thereby demonstrating a profound 
internalization and naturalization of market logic. 
The naturalization of market logic encompasses the range from Prime Minister, to 
imam, to shop owner, to Veysel, a worker at a bus station. He works long days, without 
weekends or holidays, making less than a thousand lira a month (approximately five hundred 
dollars), and has no benefits. In his own words “it feels like I am in an open-air prison.”95 
However, when asked about privatization he answers: “Privatization is good. The state is 
cumbersome. The people working for the state have no interest in their work. But here, we are 
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all after profit. We are always struggling. We are always trying to do something. But the eye of 
the memur [government employee] is always on the clock. He wants to go home as soon as 
possible. But I come here at six in the morning, and I go back at seven. This is how one should 
work.”96 Veysel’s words are shocking because they defend his own exploitation and the system 
that does nothing to alleviate it. In another conversation he demonstrates an acute awareness 
of his precariousness and complains about having no health insurance.97 Yet, he condemns the 
government worker and state intervention: a common line of Erdoğan and the AKP which he 
certainly internalized. 
Privatization of Turkey’s state monopolies was initiated by Özal in 1986. However, no 
comprehensive laws on privatization were passed and political opposition successfully stymied 
key privatization deals.98  As a result privatization primarily affected only small- or medium-
sized companies, mostly in manufacturing and industry.99 Up until 2001 government revenue 
from privatization sales totaled $7.2 billion. Since that time the government has shown 
considerably greater resolve in selling off state-owned enterprises. Between 2002 and 2015 it 
recorded $59.47 billion in revenue from privatization sales.100 The AKP sold off the national 
petrol company, steel, communications, the national airline (Turkish Airlines), the state tobacco 
monopoly, state banks, major ports, and the gas and electric grids. The state budget benefitted 
significantly from these sales. More importantly, privatization both increased the AKP’s 
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standing with the IMF and international business community, and also allowed it to weaken its 
traditional enemy, the entrenched bureaucracy close to the state.  
The legalization and regulation of Istanbul’s many squatter neighborhoods had the most 
direct impact on Turkey’s precarious populations. TOKI (Turkey’s Mass Housing Administration) 
has 191 urban renewal projects in Istanbul alone, and many more in nearly every city across 
Turkey.101 TOKI’s explicit mission is to provide affordable housing for Turkey’s low and middle 
income families.102 However, since 2001 TOKI has operated as a semi-private institution, 
generating its revenue solely from sales and rents of its development projects and land 
endowments, in addition to fees and interest from loans. The inevitable conflict of its revenue 
scheme means that families with no legal claim to their land – most residents of squatter 
neighborhoods – are forcibly removed and their houses destroyed. Other families pay fines or 
are forced to alter their property in order to accord to new regulations.103 Yet, protests in 
reaction have been surprisingly muted. Residents interviewed by Ozan Karaman felt a strong 
loyalty to the party despite its disadvantageous urban policy.104 They even framed 
dissatisfaction with the urban renewal projects as opposition to the repressive secular state, 
not the AKP: “Well, if they [the Military and the Constitutional Court] constantly attempt to 
overrule our popular will, this is what happens.”105 Loyalty to the party’s struggle, – which as 
recently as 2008 was nearly closed down by the Constitutional Court – fondness for Erdoğan, 
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and a modicum of welfare support from Islamic charities and the municipality, demobilized 
resistance to broader systemic exclusion.  
A resident and low-level official of the AKP even expressed shame and regret for their 
past “irresponsible” behavior: “They [the RP] encouraged the construction of these buildings, 
which was wrong. They took from the rich and gave to the poor… Now, you will see a lot of 
people in the media and among the politicians presenting us as victims [mağdur]. But we are 
definitely not victims. We brought this upon ourselves. Now we have to suffer the 
consequences. We want a lot of things from the state, but in order to get something, you have 
to give something. The people here have given nothing to the state. Therefore they do not have 
the right to demand anything.”106 He has sanctified the market rule of private property, leading 
him to reject the existence of systematic inequality and blame the residents’ poverty on their 
own faults and greediness. Ironically, squatting was one of the means by which poor rural 
migrants – neglected by the state – had survived their move to the cities. 
The post-2001 period was the beginning of the end for Turkey’s traditional social 
welfare regime: what has been called “inegalitarian corporatism”. 107 The mechanisms of state-
provided social support – primarily healthcare and education – were based on urban, 
government employment. In contrast, Turkey’s agricultural population – until recently most of 
Turkey’s population – relied on informal networks based on family and local ties. In 2002, the 
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AKP cut agricultural subsidies, disrupting the support coming through informal networks to the 
growing rural migrant populations in the shanty towns surrounding Turkey’s larger cities.  
Proponents of market solutions preferred placing the primary burden of risk on the 
private sector, that is, the individual and civil society. In this vein Islamic charity foundations 
and NGOs expanded their operations in welfare provision. Their success depends on appeals to 
notions of Islamic charity, as well as relationships with municipal and national political 
officials.108 The connections of Turkey’s current government, the AKP, with these civil society 
organizations has allowed it to frame social policy solutions in terms agreeable to its 
constituency, while at the same time not disturbing the principles of market fundamentalism.  
--- 
The AKP has displaced the traditionally secular “center” of Turkey’s government and 
consolidated Turkey’s Islamic civil society under its leadership. As a result of the party’s 
reformed position towards capitalism, the members of these networks have reconciled 
themselves to economic and social policy that they struggled against in the preceding 
decades.109 In Turkey the state has by no measure withdrawn or shrank: increased 
securitization, media repression, and the military occupation of Kurdish cities in the south east 
testify to that.  
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Capitalism has succeeded, that much can be said. Market ideology has never been so 
thoroughly and broadly articulated as it is now. The shifts, starts and economic volatility that 
had bruised Turkey’s economic path has finally evened out. The GDP grows at a steady pace, 
inflation is under control, and international creditors continue to see the country as a good 
place to “put their money to work.” However, other indicators tell a different story: numbers 
on human development, inequality and unemployment have been moving in the wrong 
direction. More importantly, the tradition of an authoritarian state remains unreformed. In fact, 
the AKP’s broad civil society networks give the party greater reach, and makes its power that 
much more complete. The AKP carefully circumscribes civil society by supporting government 
friendly NGOs that share its ideology.110 Press freedom has declined steadily, so that Turkey is 
now rated “not free”.111 The government brings charges of terrorism against journalists who 
write critically of the government and academics who sign peace petitions.112 It even goes so 
far as to threaten to expand terrorism laws to include academics, journalists and 
parliamentarians who “make terrorism possible,”113 and to strip them of their citizenship.114 
The AKP has also escalated Turkey’s civil war with the Kurds, and uses laws concerning urban 
renewal and historical preservation to claim neighborhoods in the centers of city in Turkey’s 
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south east and displace their Kurdish populations.115 It wages war against a “parallel state”: 
arresting or relocating thousands of police officers, bureaucrats, lawyers and judges that belong 
to the Sufi networks of Fethullah Gülen, a former allied turned enemy. In short, the AKP 
continues its efforts to expand its hegemony in Turkey. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The primary international proponent of neoliberalism in Turkey has been the IMF, and it 
has worked with various allies in its attempt to implement its economic vision: political parties, 
military leaders, business associations, civil society, etc. However, Turkey’s history makes clear 
that the IMF found no better ally than a well-integrated political and civil society. In this paper I 
have tried to show how civil society is a crucial element for managing the market. Civil society 
shapes economic subjects by dispersing and naturalizing market logic.  
Civil society is a mechanism of power alongside the juridical and political. Next to 
coercive state power, civil society comprises “the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great 
masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant 
fundamental group”116 which is achieved by organizing the “subaltern classes.”117 We’ve seen in 
Turkey how civil society exists alongside the authoritarian state, and provides a more subtle 
means for a ruling group to establish hegemony. The economy – a space of competition and 
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self-interest – requires civil society to hold individuals together and reduce the friction 
generated by economic relationships: “therefore, civil society serves as the medium of the 
economic bond.”118 Islamic civil society subdues the egoist interests of the subaltern classes by 
appealing to humility, compassion, community, and gratefulness, thereby reinforcing their 
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